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Abstract  
 
In this paper, we try to point out some important weaknesses of the contemporary French social-
economic model, focusing on relevant elements of comparison with Nordic countries. In doing so, we 
rely on the idea that large and small countries differ in terms of growth and governance strategies. Hence, 
while the “Nordic model” can be a good revelatory of some of France’s major problems, it is also an 
ambiguous template for reform. The paper starts by examining the question of growth strategy 
(macroeconomic management and structural reforms), then goes on to investigate governance strategy 
(trust, confidence, governance quality) and finally explores the issues of diversity and integration policy.  
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« La vie forte est au nord. Là s’est opéré le grand mouvement des nations ». 
Jules Michelet, Tableau de la France. 
 
 
“I am but mad north-north-west, when the wind is southerly,  
and I know a hawk from a handsaw”  
Hamlet, II, ii.  
 
 
 
 
Prologue: Northern is beautiful? 
 
 
What is the state and future of the French social-economic “model”? If the state of mind of the 
French people is of any relevance to answer this question, one can look back at the arguments 
exchanged during the presidential campaign of 2006-2007 to grasp it. Two conflicting visions of 
France’s future were then developed by the main candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène 
Royal. Yet, they resulted from two common diagnoses: first, the French model is deeply ill, and 
not merely going through a bad phase; second, France can usefully take a look at the world to 
find its inspiration for reform, studying and importing best practices from more successful 
nations. The candidate of the right expressed a marked preference for the notorious “Anglo-
saxon” pattern while the “Nordic model” was praised by the candidate of the left. Judging by the 
outcome of the election, it seems that the latter left a majority of French voters unconvinced.  
 
This could come as a surprise given the “Nordic mania” that has developed in France in the 
recent years. Parliamentary reports, academic papers, press articles all seem to tell the same story: 
since France is some much attached to equality in a globalization that has become a less 
hospitable place for it, the Nordic paradise, where openness, efficiency and equality coexist 
harmoniously, would be the French new frontier. But is it only a coincidence that there is no such 
thing as a large Nordic country?  
 
While Jules Michelet reminds us that the French Nordic obsession is nothing new, Shakespeare 
invites us to prudence when considering institutional copy-paste: it is always important to know 
hawks from herons. 
 
In this paper, we try to point out some important weaknesses of the contemporary French socio-
economic model, focusing on relevant elements of comparison with Nordic countries. In doing 
so, we rely on the idea that large and small countries differ in terms of growth and governance 
strategies. Hence, while the Nordic model can be a good revelatory of some of France’s major 
problems, it is also an ambiguous template. The paper starts by examining the question of growth 
strategy (macroeconomic management and structural reforms), then goes on to investigate 
governance strategy (trust, confidence, governance quality), and finally explores the issues of 
diversity and integration policy. For every dimension we study and compare, we try as much as 
possible to distinguish between France, continental countries and Nordic nations, in order to set 
apart continental and French issues. We start by an exposition of our basic line of reasoning 
regarding the relation between country size and social-economic policy. 
 
 
 
I] Large and small states, a basic elementary framework 
 
The relation between country size and economic policy has been an essential feature of economic 
theory until the end of the 1970s, before it gradually gave way to a-geographic approach of 
macroeconomic performance of national models, often exclusively characterized by their social 
compact. Actually, in the light of the last two decades’ literature on economic policy, it seemed as 
if increasingly integrated Nation-States have been implementing various combinations of 
macroeconomic and structural policies regardless of their size, but rather in accordance with or 
contradiction to universal canons of “good” or “bad” economic and social policies. This 
minimization of the role played by country size in growth strategies can be related to the growing 
importance of globalization and regional integration, but also to the exclusive focus (in some 
academic corners) put on supply-side economics. Whatever the causes of this neglect, the issue of 
country size is hopefully again the object of theoretical and empirical attention.  
 
The most recent works (see Alesina & Spolaore, 2003 and Alesina, Spolaore & Warcziarg, 2005 
for an overview of some models and results) attempt to determine endogenously national 
preferences using size as a causal factor. Country size itself is seen as resulting from a trade-off 
between citizens’ preferences heterogeneity costs and economies of scale in the provision of 
public goods. However interesting with regard to the causes of the size of nations, this new 
literature somewhat overlooks the consequences of the size of nations.  
 
As such, it does not acknowledge the important progress made in the understanding of the 
“Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations” by the September 1957 International 
Economic Association (IEA) conference held at The Hague, which proceedings were published 
in 19602. To quote Robinson in the Introduction of the 1960 volume, the economics and political 
economy of the size of nations is “a subject that well deserves more attention”. 
 
Among several interesting contributions, the paper by Kuznets (1960) stands out as of particular 
importance. It offers an integrated framework to distinguish small and large countries political 
economy on measurable criteria: “because of their smaller populations and hence possibly greater 
homogeneity and closer internal ties [small nations] may find it easier to make the social 
adjustments needed to take advantage of the potentialities of modern technology and economic 
growth.” Laurent (2008) interprets Kuznets framework to list four country size-based policy 
criteria for developed countries, subdivided into two areas: growth strategy and governance 
strategy. 
 
- Growth strategy:  
 
 
• Openness: Large and small countries differ on the nature of economic policies that is best 
for their short-term economic growth. As a small country is more open to international 
trade and a large country more closed, the former will benefit more from supply-side and 
competitiveness policies, while the latter needs to stimulate its domestic market through 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies in order to grow; 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Robinson (1960).  
 
• Adaptation: Because they are more open and more vulnerable to external shocks, small 
countries are forced to adapt to changing economic context faster and will better than 
large ones be able to implement structural changes in their economies; 
 
 
- Governance strategy:  
 
 
• Cohesion: because of smaller population, small countries are more cohesive than large 
ones: trust among citizens and confidence in institutions is generally higher than in larger 
countries, as is governance quality due to a better accountability;  
 
 
• Integration: small countries tend to have less diverse and fragmented population, which 
brings a contradictory outcome: while anti-immigration sentiment could be higher in 
theory in small countries less accustomed to diversity, public policies against 
discriminations and segregation, i.e. integration policy, could be more developed and 
effective in small countries than in large ones, because of the imperative of national 
cohesion.  
 
Admittedly this framework is a bit simplistic, but it will well serve our purpose. We are using the 
taxonomy of sizes having in mind the countries of Europe. But if we were to consider the world,  
we would probably have to distinguish at least three types of countries: small, medium and large. 
Europe being a collection of small and medium sized countries exhibits problems that would be 
different if it were characterized by any other combination of sizes (more on this further on).  
 
This paper thus uses this simple framework to first investigate empirically the difference in 
growth and governance strategies between France and Nordic countries  and then to determine 
whether and how Nordic countries best practices can help the “French model” out of some of its 
major predicaments.  
 
Table 1 presents the very first elements needed to grasp the difference in terms of growth 
strategy between France and Nordic countries. France, like large continental countries, is less 
open regarding international trade (except for Germany, which growth strategy will be discussed 
in detail infra). France is conversely more open than the two other large continental countries in 
terms of FDI flows and stock. These deviations from the expected can be understood using the 
concepts put forward by Delmas (1965) of “structural openness” and “functional openness”. A 
small country is structurally more open than a large one because it has limited domestic resources 
and uses the world market to overcome what Robinson (1960) has called the “penalties of 
smallness”. Yet, both large and small countries can develop a functional openness, i.e. a growth 
strategy in line or in contradiction with the advantage or disadvantage of size in certain contexts. 
Tax competition in the face of accelerating capital mobility is one obvious modality of functional 
openness for small countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. “Structural” and “functional” openness of Nordic and Continental countries. 
 
 
 
Trade to 
GDP 
(%)  
 
FDI stock 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
 
Population 
(thousands) 
 
 
2006 
GDP 
(billion US dollars,
 current prices  
and PPPs)  
2006 2006 
 
2007 
 
Corporate 
tax statutory 
rate  
(%) 
2007 
 
 
Norway 4 651 242,6 37,5 19,9 28 
Sweden 9 074 316,7 47,3 57 28 
Denmark 5 435 191,5 50,5 49,9 25 
Finland  5 266 172,4 41,9 30,6 26 
Iceland 297 10,9 41,5 48,2 18 
      
France 61 203 1962,1 27,6 35 34,4 
      
Germany  82 683 2631,6 42,3 17,4 38,9 
Italy 58 643 1699,2 28,2 16 33 
 
 
Source: OECD and UNCTAD. 
 
 
Governance strategy of small countries has been investigated under the label “democratic 
corporatism” by Kaztenstein (1985) among others, according to whom cohesive small European 
states are “distinguished by three traits: an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national 
level; a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and 
informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining between 
interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties.”  
 
There is of course a direct relation between growth and governance strategies, clearly expressed 
by Kuznets (1960): “It is in the evolution of social institutions and organizations that facilitate 
long-term peaceful type of economic growth (the only type that can be long-term) that both the 
challenge and the promise of economic growth are particularly great for small nations”. Without 
explicit reference, its contemporary influence is obvious in the most recent reflections about 
country size and economic performance: “Country size may also matter, with small countries 
sometimes found to undertake more reform, as in Continental Europe over the past two decades. 
Reasons for this could comprise greater population homogeneity, which may ease decision 
making, and greater openness to trade, which increases competitive pressures and eases concerns 
that structural reform could lead to imbalances between aggregate demand and supply” (Economic 
Policy Reforms, Going for Growth, OECD, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II] Development, income and growth strategy 
 
 
We start by examining and analysing the development and growth performance of France in 
comparison to that of the Nordic countries and then investigate the two sub-issues of growth 
strategy stated in the previous section: short-term and long-term growth strategy. 
 
 
 
1) Development and growth performance 
 
 
The broadest available international measure of development is the Human Development Index 
calculated by the United Nations. It has many shortcomings but it is broadly used in view of its 
simplicity. Table 2 indicates that France’s HDI grew at a faster pace from 1975 to 1995 than in 
most Nordic countries, while it slowed significantly from 1995 to 2005. Overall, France ranks 10th 
among the 177 countries investigated, ahead of Finland, Denmark and well ahead of Italy and 
Germany. 
 
 
Table 2. Human development dynamic 1975-2005. 
 
 
 1975 1995 2005 HDI Ranking 
in 2005 
Growth rate 
1975-1995 
Growth rate 
1995-2005 
Iceland 0,868 0,923 0,968 1 6,0 4,6 
Norway 0,87 0,938 0,968 2 7,2 3,1 
Sweden 0,872 0,935 0,956 6 6,7 2,2 
Finland 0,846 0,918 0,952 11 7,8 3,6 
Denmark 0,875 0,916 0,949 14 4,5 3,5 
       
France 0,856 0,925 0,952 10 7,5 2,8 
       
Italy 0,845 0,91 0,941 20 7,1 3,3 
Germany  0,913 0,935 22  2,4 
 
 
Source: United Nations. 
 
 
 
Table 3 allows to  have a closer look at the French  performance in 2005: France ranks 11th for 
life expectancy at birth and for combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, 
but only 18th for GDP per capita (PPP US$). The explanation of the better rank of Sweden, 
Iceland and Norway is to be found in the GDP per capita index, while the major strengths of 
France are the education index and, to a lesser extent, life expectancy. From these very first 
observations, France’s problem seems not to be one of development, but of growth of income. 
What is more, France shares this problem with the two other large continental countries. 
 
Table 3. Breakdown of HDI performance in 2005 
 
 Education Life expectancy 
 
GDP per capita 
 
Iceland 
 
0.978 
 
0.941 
 
0.985 
Norway 0.991 0.913 1.000 
Sweden 0.978 0.925 0.965 
Finland 0.993 0.898 0.964 
Denmark 0.993 0.881 0.973 
    
France 0.982 0.919 0.954 
    
Italy 0.958 0.922 0.944 
Germany 0.953 0.902 0.949 
 
Source: United Nations. 
 
Two other measures help us to confirm this intuition. First is the dynamic of GDP per capita 
from 1970 to 2006 presented in Table 4. France’s expansion is faster from 1970 (ahead of two 
out of 5 Nordic countries) to 1980 (ahead of just one) and still, barely, to 1990 (ahead of none) 
than the EU 15 and OECD average. It holds well when compared to Nordic countries, even if it 
has been surpassed by all of them. But the pace is lost from 1990 on, and in 2006, France is by 
roughly 15 percentage point behind the least prosperous Nordic country, and by an astounding 
50 points short of the wealthiest, as are Italy and Germany. France and Germany started in 1970 
ahead of OECD and EU 15 average while they lag both behind in 2006. 
 
Table 4. Volume index of GDP per capita (OECD = 100 in 2000), at 2000 price levels and PPPs 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
 
Denmark  63,2 76,1 93 115,8 125,8 
Finland  49,2 68,2 88,1 103,2 120,7 
Iceland  51,1 84,4 99,1 115,6 134,7 
Norway  57,7 86,5 106,8 145,1 159,4 
Sweden  66,8 78,5 94,7 111,5 128,6 
      
France 53,6 72,5 87,1 101,5 107,9 
      
Germany  53,5 70,6 87,7 104,2 110,1 
Italy  50,4 69,9 88,2 102,8 104,9 
      
EU15 total  51,6 67,4 83,6 101,1 109,2 
OECD total  52,6 67 83,4 100 109,1 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
An even better measure of income dynamic is OECD’s GNI per capita (defined as GDP plus net 
receipts from abroad of wages and salaries and of property income), especially since Nordic 
countries are small countries. Chart 1 shows that France is very close to Nordic countries from 
1970 to 1990. In the beginning of the 1990s, France starts to fall behind. In 2006, France ranks 
last and the gap has widened, especially with Sweden, Denmark and Norway.  
 
 
Chart 1. Gross national income per capita in US dollars, current prices and PPPs, 1970-2006. 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
How can we make sense of this recent (mis)performance and is there something in the Nordic 
countries growth strategy than can be learnt from France? 
 
 
2) Productivity, population and employment rates 
 
Actual economic growth is the sum of the rate of increase of labour productivity per hour and 
that of the number of hours worked. The latter depends on demographic, social (duration of the 
working week, rate of participation etc..) and economic factors (the degree of slack in the labour 
market).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Labour productivity: 
 
Productivity is the natural figure to look at when a country falls behind in terms of income per 
capita. Yet, in the case of France, this indicator could be misleading. The Groningen database3 
ranks France only second to Norway in terms of GDP per Hour (in 1990 GK $), with 35,33 
against 37,93 but ahead of Sweden (30,74), Denmark (30,26), Finland (29,80) and Iceland (23,64).  
 
Bit if the level of French productivity remains indeed higher than four out of five Nordic 
countries, French productivity is growing at a slower rate than most Nordic countries since the 
middle of the 1990’s , at the exception of Denmark (Chart 2).  
 
 
Chart 2. GDP per hour worked, average annual growth in percentage, 1971-2006. 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
- Population 
 
 
Turning to demographic factors, it seems that here France is in a much better position: It is, at 
least in Europe, a model for fertility rate  as it has resisted much better than all Nordic states the 
wave of decline in fertility rates observed in the EU. France is actually the most dynamic EU 
country in terms of fertility rate in 2005 (Table 5), which was not the case in 1960, but fertility 
rates started to re-increase from 1990 in France. The relative dynamic in France and Nordic 
countries from 1990 is almost exactly the opposite of that of income per capita. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, 
January 2008, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/   
 
 
 
Table 5. Total (period) fertility rates. 
 
 
 1960/1964 1970/1974 1980/1984 1990/1994 2000/2003 2004/2005 
 
       
Denmark 2.58 1.97 1.44 1.73 1.75 1.78 
Finland 2.68 1.64 1.68 1.82 1.74 1.80 
Sweden 2.30 1.90 1.64 2.04 1.62 1.75 
       
France 2.83 2.36 1.88 1.72 1.89 1.90 
       
EU-15 2.67 2.23 1.72 1.50 1.50 1.55 
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
 
- Employment rates. 
 
When one looks at employment rates in France and at their evolution over time, it  seems easier 
to explain the previous observations. First of all, France has the lowest (by far) total employment 
rate when compared to Nordic countries (Table 6), to Germany and the OECD average. Only 
Italy is doing worse.  
 
Table 6. Total employment rates in 2006. 
 
Denmark  76,9 
Finland 68,9 
Iceland  85,3 
Norway  75,5 
Sweden 74,5 
  
France  62,3 
  
Germany  67,2 
Italy  58,4 
  
OECD total 66,1 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
Yet the French “employment problem” is heavily concentrated (Table 7): it concerns the two 
extremes age groups, young and old workers, while the employment rate of the bulk of the labour 
force is in 2006 close to that of Nordic countries, higher than Germany and Italy, higher than 
OECD and EU 15 average, and has increased from 1970 to 2006. For young and old French 
workers, data show the opposite dynamic.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Total employment rates, 1970-2006. 
 
  1970   1990   2006  
 
 age group
 15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
 age group 
55-64 
 age group 
15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
age group 
55-64 
 age group 
15-24 
 age group 
25-54 
age group
 55-64 
 
Denmark  .. .. .. 65 84 53,6 63,7 85,5 60,9 
Finland 57,8 80,7 56,8 52,2 87,9 42,8 40,6 82,5 54,5 
Norway  .. .. .. 53,4 82,2 61,5 53,1 84,4 67,4 
Sweden 61,5 78,9 63,7 66,1 91,6 69,5 44 84,7 69,8 
Iceland  .. .. .. .. .. .. 72,9 89,1 84,9 
          
France  52,1 72,6 55,5 29,5 77,4 35,6 25,3 80 40,5 
Italy  39,3 59,2 28,6 29,8 68,2 32,6 25,5 73,3 32,5 
Germany  70 71,4 49,6 56,4 73,6 36,8 43,9 78,8 48,5 
          
OECD  53,1 69,1 53,9 48,8 75,8 48 43,3 76,5 53 
EU15 50,9 65 46,6 45,2 73,4 38,5 40,2 78,6 45,6 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
From these elements, it seems that France, confronted to declining economic growth, has opted 
for a model of exclusion from the labour market of young and old workers, leaving only the very 
productive employed. This evolution points to a key pattern of the French model since the 1990s 
and a major difference, not only with Nordic countries, but also with Germany: France has 
developed a “Malthusian productivity”, increasing its level by leaving out of the labour force 
workers with low productivity. 
 
This combination of high level of productivity but low employment rates of some less productive 
categories of the population was actually the argument put forward by Lindert (2004) to explain 
why the welfare state was essentially a “free lunch”. In the case of France, this process is not a 
free lunch: declining employment rates (and rising unemployment) for certain categories of the 
population has reduced the overall income per capita.  
 
Table 8 confirms that the French problem is not, to put it in the words of Paul Krugman, one of 
“inspiration” but of “perspiration” (not of productivity but employment rates and number of 
hours worked). This latter factor account for virtually the entire income gap between France and 
the US in 2006, which is not the case for any other country surveyed. Table 9 shows in addition 
that the “perspiration problem” of France lies more on the side of employment rates than on the 
side of persons in employment working shorter hours (which are quite comparable to Norway, 
Sweden or Denmark). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Breakdown of GDP per capita in its components in 2006. 
 
 
Gap in GDP per 
capita with respect to 
the US  
(in % points) 
Gap in GDP per 
hour worked with 
respect to the US  
(in % points) 
Gap in hours 
worked per capita 
with respect to the 
US (in % points) 
    
Iceland -18 -29 15 
Norway 18 41 -16 
Sweden -20 -11 -10 
Denmark -20 -15 -5 
Finland  -25 -18 -8 
    
France -29 -1 -28 
    
Germany -27 -7 -22 
Italy -34 -24 -13 
    
OECD -30 -25 -7 
Euro area  -29 -14 -18 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
Table 9. Average hours actually worked (Hours per year per person in employment). 
 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
 
Denmark  1879 1646 1518 1554 1584 
Finland  1982 1849 1769 1750 1721 
Iceland  2158 1864 1839 1885 1794 
Norway 1835 1580 1503 1455 1407 
Sweden 1730 1517 1561 1625 1583 
      
France  2012 1842 1702 1591 1564 
      
Germany  .. .. .. 1473 1436 
Italy  2145 1950 1902 1861 1800 
      
EU15 total  1876 1773 1723 1655 1625 
OECD total  1969 1893 1862 1812 1777 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
The level of productivity is hence a strength by default of the French model, due to lower 
employment rates, and, to a lesser extent, shorter hours worked. The major French problem and 
difference with Nordic countries is thus employment rates. But this problem can’t be summed up 
by the proverbial “structural rigidities” in the labour market, as it is more broadly related to real 
GDP growth, itself related to macroeconomic management co-piloted with fellow member states 
of the euro area (see Fitoussi, 2006). On this matter, Nordic countries’ profitable lessons are 
limited.  
 
 
 
3) Real GDP growth and macroeconomic management 
 
 
France is not only a large country, while Nordic countries are small. It is a large country 
belonging to the euro area and, as such, engaged in a process of monetary unification since the 
early 1990s. French real GDP growth follows almost exactly euro area economic growth from 
1971 to 2007 (which is made at 75% by the large continental countries), see Table 10.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Real GDP growth rate, 1971-2007. 
 
 
 1971-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2007 
 
Denmark 2,6 1,9 2,4 2,0 
Finland 3,6 3,5 1,6 3,3 
Iceland 6,5 3,2 2,2 3,9 
Norway 4,7 3,1 3,7 2,4 
Sweden 2,0 2,3 1,6 3,0 
     
France 3,5 2,5 1,9 1,9 
     
Euro area 3,5 2,3 2,2 2,0 
OECD total 3,8 2,9 2,6 2,5 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fitoussi (1995, 2002) has argued that rules chosen for European monetary integration have been 
very costly in terms of growth and unemployment. European monetary unification indeed came 
at a high price for future euro area’s member states, as restrictive monetary policy increased 
markedly the regional critical gap and unemployment rate (see Chart 3). 
 
 
 
Chart 3. European monetary union, unemployment rate and critical gap, in %. 
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Source: Fitoussi and Laurent (2006). 
 
Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) have gathered empirical evidence on the fact that monetary 
unification was systematically biased in favor of small states of the euro area given the rules of the 
“European economic constitution”. The fact that the single market and economic policy 
constraints give small countries the advantage of trade while not allowing large countries to 
compensate their handicap by active macroeconomic policies may explain part of the divergence 
in their performance in the recent period (and the overall disappointing record of the euro area). 
 
Chart 4 illustrates how growth was lower and unemployment higher for future euro area’s three 
continental large members during the convergence years, not only compared to small euro area 
members but also to the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4. Unemployment rate and real GDP growth, 1992-1999. 
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Source: Fitoussi and Laurent (2006). 
 
But here, a major difference between France and Germany has appeared in recent years. While 
France has relied on the stimulation of its domestic market to grow which is at odds with euro 
area rules, Germany has adopted since the mid-1990s, but especially since 2000, a small country 
growth strategy. The country’s trade openness is actually higher in 2006 than that of Norway, 
Iceland and Finland (Chart 5).  
 
 
Chart 5. Trade in goods and services, as a percentage of GDP. 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007) noted that if the German competitiveness effort has been a huge 
success in terms of net exports growth, it is still hardly compatible with the fact that Germany is a 
large country. It appears that the “shrinking” of Germany has, so far, been a counter-productive 
small country growth strategy.  
 
So why did Germany choose it in the first place? One can argue that in the face of globalization, 
all countries have become small and that Germany simply decided to acknowledge this fact. But 
Germany is first and foremost part of European integration. As such, it is subject to the 
incentives system devised by the “European economic constitution” whereby large countries are 
encouraged to behave like small ones, competing through real “social disinflation” rather than 
nominal exchange-rate policy, adopting competitiveness policies focused on labor cost reduction. 
Since large continental countries are precisely not small, the results are neither good for them 
nor, worse even, for the euro area. These policies have triggered strategic reactions from the 
other large countries, which in turn engage in the social race to the bottom. Some elements of 
this worst-case scenario for euro area social models have already appeared (see Laurent, 2006), 
measurable for instance by the intensity of tax competition in the EU compared to the rest of the 
world (Chart 6).  
 
If France wants to increase income per capita, the solution is thus not to follow Germany in 
trying to metamorphose into a small country. The euro area as a whole is fundamentally a big 
closed economy: its degree of openness is close to that of the US. This means that it should allow 
for reactive macroeconomic policies at the regional and national levels in order to make the most 
of its domestic market if it wants to stimulate its economic growth, like much of large and middle 
countries in the developed world (like the US and the UK). Otherwise, in applying economic 
rules made for small economies while it is indeed a large economy, it runs the risk of structurally 
jeopardizing growth, pitting against one another its largest economies and turn monetary union 
into a zero, or even a negative-sum game.  
 
Chart 6. Statutory corporate tax rate, in %. 
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Source: KPMG. 
 3) Structural reform and long-term growth 
 
 
Because they are more open and more vulnerable to external shocks, small countries are forced 
to adapt to changing economic context more quickly, and will, better than large ones, be able to 
implement structural changes in their economies. In the current economic context, this should 
mean that Nordic countries are more than France able to invest in knowledge economy and 
sustainable development. Here, contrary to macroeconomic management, they can be an 
example.  
 
In a nutshell the mechanism is the following: structural adjustment in a small country has a high 
rate of return, because in increasing competitiveness, it acts on the major component of its 
demand, i.e. exports. The sacrifice it implies in term of restricting internal demand is thus short 
leaved, which gives to the government a larger room of manoeuvre to implement the most 
profitable investment policies. In a medium size country, such is not the case as the sacrifice in 
terms of internal demand may be long lasting before bearing its fruits, since the increase in 
competitiveness concerns a small fraction of total demand.  
 
This means that in a small economy, a supply side policy is after all a demand policy in such a 
way that these countries do not need the instruments of a demand policy. In a medium size 
economy, this is not the case and the government has to pursue a two handed policy using 
different instruments. This brings us back to the flaws of European economic rules, blocking 
access to these instruments absent a demand policy at the European level. It is no wonder then if 
it does not constrain small economies but big ones.  The rules of the Stability and Growth Pact,  
that do not discriminate between government investment and consumption and to which France 
is submitted, are typically not well adapted to pursue a long-term growth policy (see Fitoussi, 
Laurent and Le Cacheux for a critical presentation and reform options).  
 
 
 
- Knowledge economy. 
 
 
France, like the two other large continental economies, is not investing as much as it should in 
the knowledge economy. As shown in Table 11, the overall investment in knowledge in France, 
Germany and Italy, is lower than the OECD average and much lower than Nordic countries. The 
evolution since 1997 is negative. The breakdown into three major components allows to identify 
R & D as the major problem of France. Public R & D is not so much at fault than private R & D 
(Table 12). On this chapter, France has to take its inspiration from the Nordic countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Investment in Knowledge, 2004 in % of GDP. 
 R&D Software 
Higher 
Education
Investment in 
Knowledge 
Change in investment in 
knowledge to GDP ratio 
(1997-2004) 
Denmark   2,58 1,36 1,16 5,10 1,29 
Finland   3,49 1,31 1,11 5,92 0,72 
Sweden   3,98 1,54 0,93 6,44 0,86 
      
France 2,20 1,16 0,95 4,31 0,49 
      
Italy   1,14 0,57 0,68 2,38 0,38 
Germany 2,54 0,64 0,73 3,90 0,43 
      
OECD   2,41 1,08 1,42 4,91 0,69 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Private and public R & D, 2003 in % of GDP. 
 
 
     Private R&D         Public R&D                Total R&D 
 
Norway 1 0,74 1,74 
Denmark 1,75 0,78 2,53 
Iceland 1,67 1,27 2,94 
Finland 2,46 1,01 3,47 
Sweden 2,95 1,02 3,97 
    
France 1,36 0,79 2,15 
    
    
    
    
Source: OECD. 
 
 
- Sustainable development. 
 
 
The performance of France in terms of climate change is flattering, the country being ahead of its 
Kyoto target, which is not the case of Norway and Iceland. But France has not made a genuine 
effort to re-orientate its energy mix towards renewable, with the share of renewable energy 
actually falling from 1990 to 2005 (Table 13). Even Finland, which also relies on nuclear energy, 
has developed renewable energies in its energy mix. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Climate change and renewable energy performance. 
 
 
GHG emissions 
growth 1990-2005 
 
 
 
Kyoto target
 
 
 
 
Share of renewable 
energies in primary 
energy consumption 1990 
 
Share of renewable energies 
in primary energy 
consumption 2005  
 
Denmark -7,8 -21,0 6,7 16,2 
Sweden -7,4 4,0 24,9 29,8 
Finland -2,6 0,0 19,2 23,2 
Norway 8,8 1,0 53,2 40,4 
Iceland 10,5 10,0 64,9 73 
     
France -1,9 0,0 7 6 
     
Germany -18,7 -21,0 1,6 4,8 
Italy 12,1 -6,1 4,2 6,5 
Spain 52,3 15,0 7 6,1 
     
EU-15 -2,0 -8,0 4,9 6,7 
EU-27 -11,0  4,4 6,7 
 
Source: European Environmental Agency.. 
On both counts, France should take note of Nordic countries’ long-term growth policies. But 
how can large countries be inspired by small countries’ ability to foster change if they can not 
implement it in practice because they lack the corresponding institutions and governance? We 
now thus turn to these issues. 
 
 
 
 
II] Trust, confidence and governance strategy 
 
 
If the question is merely one of public and social spending, France is now “out-nordic-ing” 
almost all Nordic countries. Public social spending in France is in fact higher than in all Nordic 
countries, except Sweden (Chart 7). What is more, France has increased its total spending from 
1990 to 2007 to reach 53% of GDP (Chart 8), whereas Nordic countries have either stabilized or 
decreased theirs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chart 7. Public social expenditures in % of GDP, 1980-2003. 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 8. Total public expenditures in % of GDP, 1990-2007. 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
But of course the quantity of public and social spending does not guarantee policy success, it is 
the quality of the expenditures that matters. In this respect, a lively debate has developed in 
France about the Nordic model of trust, confidence and governance quality. This new literature 
points at the development of distrust in France as a blocker of social policy efficiency and turns 
to Nordic countries for inspiration. Danish “flexisecurity” in particular is praised by the 
increasing influential proposition of “professional paths securization”. We now explore this 
debate and start by asking ourselves if France is truly distrustful. 
 
 
1) The paradox of French pessimism: fertility and the future 
 
 
The first form of trust we look at is trust in the future. As noted in Fitoussi and Laurent (2007), 
there is a paradox here between subjective French pessimism, recurrently expressed and 
highlighted for instance in the Eurobarometer surveys, and an objective booming fertility rate, 
which can be interpreted as a sign of trust in the future. In the EU, France has at once the 
highest fertility rate and the most pessimistic public opinion about the future. Here again, France 
is clearly at odds with Nordic countries, where optimism in the future and fertility are both high 
(Chart 9). 
 
 
 
 
Chart 9. The French paradox: fertility and optimism* (2005) in the EU. 
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* Fertility is the total fertility rate; pessimism is the percentage of positive response to the 
question “do you think things in your country are going in the right direction?” 
 
Source: Eurostat and Eurobarometer.  
 
 
 
Admittedly, French fertility dynamism can be related to the generosity of family policy in France. 
But how can it coexist with such pessimism in the future? One possible explanation is that 
French malaise is a public or social malaise rather than a private one. French institutions and/or 
social relations would be feeding negative subjective sentiments. While the correlation between 
private happiness and public or social optimism is typically very high, France appears to be too 
socially pessimistic for its level of private happiness, as illustrated in Table 14. This observation 
brings us to the question of generalized trust and confidence in institutions. 
 
 
Table 14. Happiness and pessimism, 2006. 
 
 
How happy  
are you ?  
(% of “very happy”)
For most people in country life  
is getting worse  
(% of “agree”) 
 
Germany 47,6 70 
Denmark 80,3 15,6 
Finland 74,5 22,3 
Norway 69,4 13,3 
Sweden 68 29,1 
 
France 48,4 84,4 
 
Total 51,7 51,6 
 
Source: European Social Survey. 
 
 
2) France’s crisis of confidence: generalized trust and confidence in institutions  
 
 
A new literature tries to explore the connection between France dysfunctional social model and 
trust and confidence in institutions among French. Using inter alia 1980-2000 World Values 
Survey data, Algan and Cahuc (2007) go so far as to argue that “the deficit in trust among French 
account for 66% of the income gap with Sweden” and that French GDP would “be increased by 
5% or 1500 euros per person if French trusted their fellow citizens like Swedish do”. The 
interesting point of this literature is the shift from the typical OECD Job Study perspective that 
attributes all of French evils to “structural rigidities” in the labor market. The idea here is to 
investigate whether dysfunctions, inter alia in the labour market, and more generally in the 
French social model, derive primarily from a lack of trust and confidence. 
 
 
- Generalized trust 
 
Algan and Cahuc (2007) argue that the “spiral of defiance is what prevents France from 
implementing a social-democracy of the Scandinavian type”. The “trust deficit” among French,  
which authors relate to un-civic attitudes, “blocks cooperation abilities and social dialogue” so 
that the State is forced to intervene in social relations, harming social partners legitimacy, which 
further increases defiance between workers, firms and the State. On possible remedies, Cahuc 
and Algan (2006) warn that: “civic attitudes cannot be systematically changed quickly just by 
changing institutions… civic attitudes impose real constraints on the choice of labour market 
institutions. From this point of view, it is unlikely that countries with weak public-spiritedness 
can implement the Danish Model without specific action aimed at changing the values of their 
citizens.” French should thus find ways to amend their civic attitudes in order to benefit from a 
more efficient and egalitarian social model like Nordic countries.  
 
Let’s first take a look at “generalized trust” in France according to the latest available wave of the 
World Values Survey. Table 15 reports that France is indeed an exception in this respect, not 
only compared with Nordic countries but also to Italy and Germany.  
 
Table 15. Generalized trust*. 
 
    
    
Denmark 64  
Finland 57  
Norway 65  
Sweden 64  
 
France 
 
21 
 
    
Italy 32  
Germany 33  
 
* Percentage of people responding “most people can be trusted” to the question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”. 
 
Source: OECD, Data from the 1999-2004 wave of the World Values Survey. 
A closer look at the evolution of generalized trust in France since the 1980s in the light of the 
European values survey data reveals that trust was actually higher in France in the 1980s than it is 
now, while the French social model was closer to its original features than it is now. In every 
other country in the table, trust has increased (Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16. Generalized trust*. 
   
 1981 1990 1999/2000
    
Sweden  56,7 66,1 66,3 
Norway  60,9 65,1  
Iceland  39,8 43,6 41,1 
Denmark  52,7 57,7 66,5 
Finland   62,7 57,4 
    
France  24,8 22,8 21,3 
    
Italy  26,8 35,3 32,6 
W. Germany/  37,9 37,5 
Germany   
 
* Percentage of people responding “most people can be trusted” to the question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”. 
 
Source: EuropeanValues Survey. 
 
 
 
- Confidence in institutions  
 
But Cahuc and Algan (2007) insist that trust should be considered more specifically, in relation to 
public institutions such as the legal system, the Parliament, trade unions. The French, they argue, 
have an exceptionally lower confidence in their institutions than other countries, most of all the 
Nordic ones. Table 17 shows a more nuanced picture for trust in Parliament and the civil sector, 
with France actually toping Finland, Germany and Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Share of respondents reporting high levels of trust  
in different entities in the early 2000s 
 
 
 
Trust in 
Parliament
Trust in the 
civil sector
 
Denmark 0,49 0,55 
Finland 0,44 0,41 
Iceland 0,72 0,56 
Norway 0,69 0,51 
Sweden 0,51 0,49 
   
France 0,41 0,46 
   
Germany 0,36 0,39 
Italy 0,34 0,33 
 
Source: OECD, Data from the 1999-2004 wave of the World Values Survey 
 
 
But the real problem highlighted by Cahuc and Algan (2007) is the higher level of people in 
France declaring not to trust institutions at all. Table 18 and 19 (reporting percentages of 
mistrust) show in this respect that French were indeed in 2000 the least trustful of all countries 
surveyed for all dimensions studied, except for confidence in the social security system, in which 
Italians put even less confidence than the French. The important point here is that the French 
pattern of distrust seems to be different from Germany but quite close to Italy. Yet, again, some 
observations are puzzling. For instance, French seem to trust trade unions more in 2000 than in 
1990, while trust in all other institutions has declined over this period. Note also that the social 
security system (arguably a large part of the “French social model”) appears to be the most 
trusted of all French institutions in 1990 and 2000. 
 
 
 
Table 18. Dis-confidence* in institutions, 1990 
 
 
in the legal 
system 
in 
Parliament in trade unions in civil service
in social security 
system 
 
Sweden 7,7 11,1 14,8 8,5 12,3 
Norway 2,5 5,1 6,6 6,7 8,9 
Iceland 4 8,2 7,5 7,5 4,5 
Denmark 1,6 9,6 13,7 5,3 3,5 
Finland 3,1 15,1 12,5 11,9 2,3 
 
France 10,8 17,3 28,7 15,5 7,1 
 
Italy 21,9 22,6 21,9 28,4 20,6 
W. Germany 4 7 16,6 10,2 3,6 
 
 
* Percentage of people responding “none at all” to the question: “How much trust do you 
have…” ? 
 
 
Table 19. Dis-confidence* in institutions, 1999/2000 
 
 
in the justice 
system 
in 
Parliament in trade unions in civil service
in social security 
system 
 
Sweden 4,7 6,1 9,7 5,4 5,3 
Iceland 3,9 2,8 6,2 3,5 7,2 
Denmark 2,3 6,7 8,4 4,3 2,8 
Finland 3,5 9,4 6,9 8,3 3,8 
France 
 
19,5 
 
23,6 
 
25,4 
 
17,7 
 
9,8 
 
 
Italy 19,1 16,8 24 15,2 18,8 
Germany 6,9 16 13,1 11,7 8,8 
 
 
Source: EuropeanValues Survey. 
 
* Percentage of people responding “none at all” to the question: “How much trust do you 
have…” ? 
 
 
 
 
 
From these first observations, two related questions emerge: is the French social model really to 
blame for the lack of trust among citizens? Is the poor quality of institutions in France to blame 
for the French lack of confidence in them?  
 
Let’s start with the second question: are French right about the quality of their institutions and 
governance? Do they exhibit significantly less quality than in other countries, the Nordic ones to 
start with? 
 
 
- Indicators of governance quality  
 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi have built a dataset of indicators widely used in the field of 
development policy, but that can prove useful here as well, although one would expect rich 
western democratic countries not to differ much in terms of governance quality. Actually, they 
do, and French institutions seem of lesser quality, not only than institutions in the Nordic 
countries but also in Germany, while Italy is in all dimensions studies the less well ranked (Table 
20). According to the data, the lack of confidence in institutions would find a logical explanation 
and reforms thus would be needed in this department to improve confidence. The lower level of 
confidence in institutions could also be explained by disappointed high expectations.  
 
 
 
Table 20. Governance score (-2,5 to +2,5). 
       
 
Political 
stability 
Voice and 
accountability 
Government
effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
law 
Control of 
corruption 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
0,82 
 
 
1,72 
 
 
2,29 
 
 
1,81 
 
 
2,03 
 
 
2,39 
Finland 1,47 1,63 2,08 1,7 1,95 2,57 
Iceland 1,6 1,47 2,13 1,62 2,03 2,46 
Norway 1,21 1,64 2,1 1,34 2,02 2,13 
Sweden 1,13 1,55 2 1,44 1,86 2,24 
       
France 0,46 1,4 1,2 1,06 1,31 1,44 
       
Germany 0,83 1,48 1,52 1,39 1,77 1,78 
Italy 0,28 1,14 0,38 0,84 0,37 0,31 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2006  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- What determines generalized trust?  
 
 
The question of the determinants of generalized trust remains. Should we attribute it, as 
suggested by Algan and Cahuc (2007), to poor civic attitudes reinforced by an omnipresent State? 
Does it depend on confidence in institutions, in which case solving the confidence crisis in 
institutions would also solve the lack of trust? Does it depend on cultural mind-frame unrelated 
to the institutional context, or better, of which the institutional context would be a consequence 
and not a cause? Table 19, even if it does not present  rigorous econometric tests allows 
measuring the relative importance of subjective, economic, institutional and civic variables in the 
determination of trust. The importance of civic variables appears doubtful, as in the 
determination of the most significant determinant of generalized trust (Table 21 & 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Determinants of generalized trust, 2004. 
  
 Coefficient Significance
   
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair 0,4 0 
Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves 0,22 0 
How happy are you 0,03 0,0005 
   
How satisfied with present state of economy in country 0,08 0 
Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years 0,09 0,0193 
   
Trust in country's parliament 0,06 0 
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country 0,04 0 
Trust in the legal system 0,03 0,0005 
   
Citizens should not cheat on taxes 0,04 0,0983 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities 0,02 0,2905 
Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want -0,02 0,3673 
Falsely claim government benefit: social security or other, last 5 years -0 0,7912 
   
Intercept 0,19  
Valid N 9884  
Adjusted R Squared 0,411  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Determinants of “subjective trust”, 2004. 
 
Dependent variable: “Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair” 
 
 Coefficient Significance
   
How happy are you 0,2 0 
   
How satisfied with present state of economy in country 0,12 0 
Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years 0,16 0,0003 
   
Trust in the legal system 0,1 0 
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country 0,07 0 
Trust in country's parliament 0,05 0 
   
Falsely claim government benefit: social security or other, last 5 years -0,04 0,0523 
Citizens should not cheat on taxes 0,03 0,2777 
You should always obey law even if it means missing good opportunities 0,02 0,4575 
Occasionally alright to ignore law and do what you want 0 0,9419 
   
   
Intercept 2,03  
Valid N 9911  
Adjusted R Squared 0,161  
 
 
Source: European Social Survey. 
 
 
 
What kind of lessons should France take from the Nordic countries on the chapter of trust and 
confidence? From our limited observations, Improving institutions’ democratic quality and the 
state of the economy could prove useful. The role of equality policies should also not be 
overlooked. Rothstein and Uslaner (2006) indeed argue that: “low levels of trust and social capital 
that plague many countries are caused by too little government action to reduce inequality”. They 
insist that: “the policies most effective in reducing inequalities are universal social policies. These 
policies stem from our sense of generalized trust–and, in turn, help to create a more trusting 
society.” As shown in Table 23, France is less egalitarian than all Nordic countries except 
Norway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Income inequality indicators. 
 
 
 
Gini Index
 
 (2006) 
Income quintile 
share ratio  
(2006) 
 
Denmark 24 3.4 
Finland 26  
Sweden 24 3.5 
Iceland 26 3.7 
Norway 30 
 
4.6 
 
France 27 4 
 
Italy 32 5.5 
 
Germany 27 4.1 
 
 
Source : Eurostat. 
 
 
This argument is all the more important in the current French context that contemporary  
evolution of income inequality in France in the recent period seems to have been overlooked, as 
documented empirically by Landais (2007) which findings are summarized in Table 24. 
 
 
Table 24. Income evolution in France, 1998-2005. 
 
  
P99,99-100 +42,6%   
P99,9-100 +32,0%    
P99-100 +19,4%     
P95-100 +11,3%   
P90-100 +8,7%     
P0-90 +4,6%     
Median income + 4,29% 
 
Source: Landais (2007). 
 
 
3) France’s crisis of confidence: the role of trade unions and job satisfaction 
 
A final issue touching on the matter of trust regards the role played by trade unions in the French 
social model and the general level of social relations quality that results from it, with job 
satisfaction as an indicator of this quality. Phillipon (2007), also taking Nordic countries as a 
reference, argues that France is burdened with poor workplace relations due to the absence of 
strong trade unions and resulting in low job satisfaction. Table 25 illustrates some of Phillipon’s 
arguments.  
 
  Table 25. Workplace relations and job satisfaction. 
 
 
Workplace relations 
quality 
Job satisfaction 
 
 
Finland 5,42 65 
Denmark 5,97 72,5 
Sweden 5,92 56,9 
Norway 5,72  
 
France 3,33 47,2 
 
Germany 5,25 60,3 
Italy 4,22 53,6 
 
Source : Philippon (2007), p.14, data from Global Competitiveness Report and World Value 
Survey. 
 
 
While workplace relations quality seems to be markedly low in France, its relation with the 
weakness of trade unions must be considered cautiously. Trade union density has not changed 
much for the last 15 years in France and was always much lower than that of Nordic countries. 
What is more, Italy’s union density is higher than Germany’s with workplace relations quality 
higher in Germany (Chart 10). What is true however is that trade unions seem to be the least 
trusted institution in France (see supra Table 19). 
 
 
 
Chart 10. Union density, 1970-2003, in %. 
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Note: Union density expresses the rate of “actual” to “potential” membership, usually as a percentage. For 
any one union, potential membership is given by eligibility criteria, usually defined in the union rulebook 
or constitution. 
 
Source: Visser, J. (2006), 'Union membership statistics in 24 countries', Monthly Labor Review, 
January, pp. 38-49. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/01/art3full.pdf  
On the consequences side, a closer look at the dynamic of job satisfaction through the European 
values survey brings also some qualifications. Philippon’s data can be reconstituted by adding the 
highest three levels of job satisfaction, but a different picture appears while considering the 
lowest three or level 6 and 7 of satisfaction (fairly high), where France is the highest ranked of all 
countries surveyed (Table 26). The evolution of job satisfaction through time is also puzzling, 
with satisfaction in France increasing in the last two decades, while it has decreased for instance 
in Sweden (Table 27).  
  
  Table 26. Job satisfaction* 
 
 France  Germany  Italy  Denmark Sweden  Finland  Iceland  
        
dissatisfied 1,8 0,9 2 0,8 0,6 0,2 0,5 
2 1,1 0,5 1,3 0,9 2,3 0,9 0,3 
3 1,5 1 2,3 1,1 2,3 2 0,9 
4 3,5 1,8 3,5 1,4 3,2 1,6 2,1 
5 10,7 5,1 6,8 5,3 7,5 4,7 4 
6 10,8 9,3 11,2 6,7 10 7,6 7,8 
7 22,4 19,9 19,2 11,2 17,6 19,1 17,9 
8 26,4 30,2 25,6 25,6 30,6 35,8 30,8 
9 13,2 17,4 13 25,3 17,8 20,1 21,4 
satisfied 8,4 13,9 15,1 21,6 8,1 8,1 14,4 
 
8 + 9 + 10 48 61,5 53,7 72,5 56,5 64 66,6 
1 + 2 + 3 4,4 2,4 5,6 2,8 5,2 3,1 1,7 
 
* Percentage of respondents to the question “How satisfied are you with your job?” 
Source: European values survey. 
 
  Table 27. Job satisfaction* through time in France and Sweden. 
 
 France 1981 France 1999 Sweden 1981 Sweden 1999 
     
dissatisfied 2,7 1,8 0,3 0,6 
2 2,5 1,1 1,4 2,3 
3 3,7 1,5 2,6 2,3 
4 3,4 3,5 1,8 3,2 
5 14,4 10,7 5,6 7,5 
6 13,4 10,8 6,2 10 
7 17,7 22,4 12,2 17,6 
8 21,6 26,4 27 30,6 
9 11 13,2 22,2 17,8 
satisfied 9,5 8,4 20,7 8,1 
     
8 + 9 + 10 42,1 48 69,9 56,5 
 
Source: European values survey. 
III] Diversity and Integration  
 
In the final part of this paper, we try to shed some light on the question of integration policy, i.e. 
policies against discriminations and segregation. Logic would want diversity and fragmentation to 
be higher in large countries than in small ones, in France than in Nordic countries. We start by 
reviewing empirical evidence of this intuition.  
 
 
1) Diversity and fragmentation 
 
 
- Diversity 
 
Table 28 shows that diversity, captured by the ratio of the foreign-born population to total 
population, appears to be higher in France in 2005 than in Denmark or Finland, but lower than 
in Norway, and much lower than in Sweden. Yet, the foreign population is higher in 2005 in 
France than in all Nordic countries. While the data for Germany confirm the link between 
country size and diversity, figures for Italy contradict it.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28. Foreign-born and foreign populations, as a percentage of the total population. 
 
 
 Foreign-born population Foreign population 
  1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 
 
Denmark 4,8 5,8 6,5 4,2 4,8 5,0 
Finland  2,0 2,6 3,4 1,3 1,8 2,2 
Norway  5,5 6,8 8,2 3,8 4,0 4,8 
Sweden 10,5 11,3 12,4 6,0 5,4 5,3 
        
France  .. 7,3 8,1 .. 5,6 5,8 
        
Germany 11,5 12,5 12,9 8,8 8,9 8,8 
Italy .. 2,5 .. 1,7 2,4 4,6 
 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
- Fragmentation 
 
Table 29 yields mixed results with regards to fragmentation. According to ethnic and religion 
indexes, France (and Germany and Italy) are more fragmented than Nordic countries (except 
Finland for the ethnic criterion). But the language index is higher in Finland and Sweden? 
Overall, still, continental countries (and France among them) appear more fragmented than 
Nordic ones. 
 
 
 
Table 29. Fragmentation indexes. 
 
 Ethnic Language Religion 
    
Denmark 0,08 0,10 0,23 
Finland 0,13 0,14 0,25 
Iceland 0,08 0,08 0,19 
Norway 0,06 0,07 0,20 
Sweden 0,06 0,20 0,23 
    
France 0,10 0,12 0,40 
    
Germany 0,17 0,16 0,66 
Italy 0,11 0,11 0,30 
 
 
Source: Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain 
Wacziarg, “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 8, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 155-194. 
 
 
2) Discriminations and segregation 
  
 
With diversity and fragmentation higher in France and continental countries, one would expect 
attitudes towards immigration to be more positive. The reverse is actually true, with anti-
immigrants sentiments much higher in Germany and France than in Nordic countries. The more 
immigrants it seems, the more anti-immigrants are exacerbated where one could expect (hope) 
that the importance of immigrants population would reduce xenophobia (Table 30). 
 
 
Table 30. Attitudes towards immigration, 2004. 
 
 
Immigrants make country 
worse place to live* 
Allow no immigrants of different 
race/ethnic group from majority 
 
 
Finland 7,6 10,7 
Sweden 7,2 3,5 
Norway 13,1 6,6 
Iceland 2,5 8,5 
Denmark 9,8 10,3 
   
France 19,8 15 
   
Germany 17,1 15,5 
 
 
Source: European social survey. 
Discriminations of course are also objective, as migrants are offered or not the conditions of 
their social integration. In this respect also, most Nordic countries appear overall more hospitable 
to immigrants than France and Germany, while Italy ranks higher (Table 31). France would 
certainly be well-inspired to invest more in migrants welfare-enhancing public policies, even if the 
recent creation of the HALDE is a step forward (that accounts for France’s rank according to the 
anti-discrimination indicator). 
 
 
 
Table 31. Migrant integration index, 2005. 
 
 
Rank  
(out of 32) Overall 
Labour 
market access
Family 
reunion 
Long term 
residence
Political 
participation 
Access to 
nationality 
Anti-
discrimination
 
1 Sweden 88 100 92 76 93 71 94 
5 Finland 67 70 68 65 81 44 75 
7 Italy 65 85 79 67 55 33 69 
8 Norway 64 70 66 72 86 39 54 
 EU-15 60 64 59 61 60 48 66 
11 France 55 50 45 48 52 54 81 
14 Germany 53 50 61 53 66 38 50 
21 Denmark 44 40 36 67 55 33 33 
         
 
Gap between top 
3 Nordic and 
France 18 30 30 23 35 -3 -7 
        
  
Source: Jan Niessen, Thomas Huddleston and Laura Citron, Migrant Integration Policy Index, 
Brussels,  British Council and Migration Policy Group, September 2007. The Migrant Integration 
Policy. Index may be downloaded from www.integrationindex.eu  
 
 
- Segregation 
 
Since Sweden is presented as the best practice country for migrants’ integration in the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index, we will finally compare Sweden with France on the chapter of 
segregation. 
 
Fitoussi, Laurent and Maurice (2004) have highlighted the fact that, in contemporary France, 
socio-spatial polarisation bears witness to a long period of persistent unemployment and 
generates a dynamic of urban divergence. This has found a particularly clear expression in the 
creation and expansion of the French ZUS (zones urbaines sensibles – sensitive urban areas). 
Furthermore, the authors formulated the hypothesis that urban segregation had a multiplier effect 
on the hysteresis observed in the labour market, the key drivers of this “spatial hysteresis” being 
the establishment of a physical and social distance from employment and the development of 
pronounced discrimination in the labour market. This dynamic of divergence grows steadily in 
time and space within a genuine system of urban segregation, whereby social inequalities in 
sensitive urban areas are perpetuated over time due to difficulties in education and training 
systems while their geographical extension are caused by unequal access to housing, collective 
facilities and inequalities in local public finances.  
 
The latest available figures (Table 32) largely confirm this conclusion , even if they show that 
from 2002 to 2006, unemployment actually decreased more in the ZUS than in the rest of 
France, maybe showing positive impact from the implementation of  urban policies reforms 
(from 1990 to 1999, unemployment increased more in the ZUS than in the rest of France). What 
is more, the double penalty resulting from staying in a ZUS and being an immigrant, is as strong 
as ever. Chart 11 illustrates how the ZUS aggravate French social trends. 
 
 
 
 
Table 32. ZUS and the rest of France. 
 
 
 ZUS Rest of France
   
Sucess at the Baccalauréat S exam (June 2006) 84,4 89,1 
Sucess at the Brevet exam (2004-2005) 68,3 80,9 
Percentage of pupils lagging behind in 6ème grade (2005) 5,8 2,9 
Percentage of pupils lagging behind in 3ème grade (2005) 9,3 5 
Reduction in unemployment from 2002 to 2006 in Category 1  -14 -9,4 
Inactivity rate of 25-49 years old (2005) 21 10,7 
Inactivity rate overall (2005) 34,3 25,1 
Unemployment rate for 15-24 years old (2005) 44,9 22,2 
Unemployment overall (2005) 22,1 10,5 
Unemployment rate among non-immigrants (2005) 19,7 9,7 
Unemployment rate among immigrants from EU (2005) 9,6 8,5 
Unemployment rate among non-EU immigrants (2005) 31,7 21,5 
Income at the 1st decile in euros (2002) 6115 12266,5 
Income at the 5th decile in euros (2002) 9048,5 14329,5 
Interdecile gap (D9/D1) in 2002 2 1,3 
Low-income population perceiving a social allocation (2003-2004) 28,6 10,4 
Population declaring itself in bad health condition (2002-2003) 32 26 
 
 
Source : Observatoire des Zones Urbaines Sensibles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 11. ZUS and the rest of France. 
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Source: Observatoire des zones urbaines sensibles. See Table 32 for data details. 
 
 
But Sweden, with a very different approach to integration policy, also has a problem of 
segregation. As noted in Andersonn (2007),  “it is something of a paradox that, since the country 
declared itself multicultural in 1975, integration into the labour market has become much more 
problematic, immigrants’ political participation has dropped, and increasing proportions of 
especially newly arrived immigrants have concentrated in ‘immigrant-dense’ neighbourhoods.” 
“Furthermore, segregation increases the risk of racism and discrimination. The multicultural 
model seems more out of reach now than it was at the time of its breakthrough 30 years ago.” 
adds the author. Åsa (2006) also remarks that “during the 1990s, the residential segregation of 
immigrants increased in many Swedish cities.” 
 
Biterman and Franzén (2007) provide empirical evidence of segregation in large Swedish cities. 
Table 33 and 34 reproduce some of their results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33. Segregation in Sweden. 
 
 
 Living in region 
Greater 
Stockholm 
 
Greater 
Göteborg 
 
Greater 
Malmö 
 
Whole 
country 
 
Total population 1,830,600 769,900 528,300 8,940,800 
 
of which born in 
Sweden (%) 
 
82 
 
85 
 
83 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34. Segregation in Sweden. 
 
 
  
Economic development 
 
  
Well-off 
 
 
Economically 
integrated slightly 
impoverished 
Poor Very poor 
Total
Predominantly Swedish-born 
population 
262 90 14 1 367
Ethnically integrated, elements 
of visible minorities 
10 
 
 
 
32 
 
34 
 
1 
 
77 
 
Predominantly minorities 
 
– 
 
10 
 
25 
 
8 
 
43 
 
Almost exclusively visible 
minorities – 
 
 
– 
 
 
1 
 
 
13 
 
 
14 
 
 
E
th
n
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
 
Total 272 132 74 23 501
 
 
Source : Danuta Biterman, Eva Franzén (2007), Table 6:3. Distribution of urban neighbourhoods in 
Greater Stockholm, Greater Göteborg and Greater Malmö by ethnic and economic types of development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How should the French model of integration take into account the Nordic experience? Resolute 
progress should be made in anti-discrimination policies, since discrimination exacerbates still 
further the phenomenon of urban segregation impacting, in particular, access to housing, work 
and training. It affects not only foreigners, but also French citizens of, or assumed to be of, 
foreign origin. 
 
But should France embrace multiculturalism of the Swedish type? The French model of 
integration is certainly in crisis, but it is possible that multiculturalism is simultaneously in crisis in 
Sweden. As noted by Lamont and Laurent (2006)4, in France, “the frustration and resentment 
expressed by French minorities is largely caused by the contradiction between a fantasized 
equality and real-life discrimination”. Yet, the French “republican model” is not to be altogether 
thrown overboard. The French model of integration has been neglecting the social conditions 
necessary to its success for too long. It now has to apparently contradict itself to be renewed, by 
acknowledging that where the initial conditions of access to society have deteriorated too far, 
greater equality must take over from strict legal neutrality.  
 
 
                                                 
4 “France shows its true colors”, The Boston Globe, June 3 2006, reprinted as “Identity: France shows its 
true colors” in The International Herald Tribune, June 6 2006. 
 
Epilogue: May 1968, models and systems 
 
 
It is usually when a social system is entering a severe crisis that it becomes a model for others. If 
this is so, Nordic countries should be worried about all the international attention they are 
getting. France itself was a “model” in the late 1960s for the rest of the world.  
 
How can the Nordic model be helpful in solving some of the major problems France is facing? 
We have tried to show in this paper that taking country size difference into account is a first step 
in the right direction. The next one may be to realize that there is not so much a “Nordic model” 
than a “Nordic method”5, which allows implementing peacefully efficient reforms. While France 
can not import “ready to wear” institutional features, it should try to understand Nordic 
countries’ customized reform design. 
 
The 40th anniversary of May 1968, the most important post-war civil event of French history, that 
started by way of youth revolt in universities, but did not lead to a betterment of youth welfare or 
universities, now both a major weakness of the French model, is a good reminder that reform 
rhetoric often trumps reform action in France. France has the lowest figures for youth labor 
market integration not only compared to all Nordic countries, but also to continental ones (Table 
35), this table being only of course the tip of the iceberg of the youth’s predicament in France6. 
 
 
 
Table 35. Youth (15-24 years old) in the labor market 2006. 
 
 
 Unemployment  
rates 
Employment/population 
ratios 
Labour force 
participation rates 
 
Iceland 
 
8.4 72,9 79,5 
Norway 8.6 53,1 58,1 
Sweden 21.3 44,0 56,0 
Finland 18.8 40,6 50,1 
Denmark 7.6 63,7 69,0 
    
France 23.9 25,3 33,2 
    
Germany 13.5 43,9 50,7 
Italy 21.6 25,5 32,5 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Grejbine and Laurent (2008) make this point about Sweden.  
6 For an analysis of French youth social itinerary since the 1960s, see Chauvel, Louis, 1998 [2e éd. 2002], 
Le destin des générations : structure sociale et cohortes en France au XXe siècle, Paris : Presses 
universitaires de France ; for a contemporary comparison between French and Danish youth, see C. Van 
de Velde, Devenir adulte. Sociologie comparée de la jeunesse en Europe, Paris, PUF, « Le Lien social », 
2006. 
 
French universities should not as well be a motive of national pride, as illustrated by Table 36. 
 
 
Table 36. Top universities in 2007. 
 
 
 Ranking overall Top 100 Top 200 Top 300 Top 400 Top 500 
 
Sweden 7 4 4 9 10 11 
Denmark 12 1 3 4 4 4 
Norway 13 1 1 2 3 4 
Finland 14 1 1 1 3 5 
 
France            6            4         7       12    18 23 
 
Germany           4           6        14       22    36 41 
 
Source: Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. 
 
 
There is much to learn from Nordic countries in those two respects. But the major limit of the 
Nordic template ultimately lies in the fact that a model’s coherence is idiosyncratic. France chose 
to preserve solidarity in the face of globalization, as the importance (and quality) of its public 
services and social protection shows. Yet, this commitment only applies for a part of the French 
population. Furthermore, a high level of solidarity can only be sustained in terms of public 
finance if income per capita grows rapidly and France can only increase its income per capita by 
expanding the scope of its exceptional but partly artificial productivity. Given France’s size, this 
implies both an ambitious industrial and research policy and a reactive macroeconomic 
management so that employment rates grow for all categories of workers. The scale of these 
policies is now European. In this regard, social and tax competition among European countries 
should not be viewed as a sustainable growth strategy, but as a dangerous illusion: a quick fix that 
risks jeopardizing decades of European integration.  
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